ABSTRACT As recently studied, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) suffer from growing Hardware Trojan (HT) attacks, and many techniques, e.g., register-transfer level (RTL) code-based analyzing, have been presented to detect HTs on FPGAs. However, for most of the FPGA end users, they can only obtain bitstream, rather than the RTL code. Therefore, we present a new FPGA reverse engineering tool-chain. It can precisely transform the FPGA bitstream to an RTL code and therefore assists in HT detection. In detail, we first construct an integrated database involving the FPGA architecture information and the bitstream mapping information. Then, we build two tools, namely, bitstream reversal tool (BRT) and netlist reversal tool (NRT). They can be combined together to retrieve the RTL code from the FPGA bitstream in moderate time. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our tool-chain, we evaluate it qualitatively and quantitatively by using two benchmarks (ISCAS'85 and ISCAS'89) and three real applications (8051 core, 68HC08, and AES). Our tool-chain is comprehensive since it covers all the reverse engineering stages, from bitstream to netlist and from netlist to code, without any support from other tools. Moreover, it rebuilds the netlist with a 100% correct rate and retrieves RTL code, which is exactly, functionally equivalent to the original one for all our benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first tool that can perform integrated, precise reverse engineering for FPGAs, paving the way for the netlist-/code-based HT detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, FPGAs are widely used in various domains due to their high performance and reconfigurability, such as aerospace systems, automotive, high-performance computing and IoT (Internet of Things), etc., as shown in Fig. 1a , and therefore, attract growing attentions from hardware hackers [1] . Recently, some adversaries successfully inserted HTs (Hardware Trojans) into FPGAs, aiming to steal confidential data like encryption keys or change their original functionality. For example, Chakraborty et al. [2] searched for the empty space of FPGA bitstream and then implanted HTs in it. Fern et al. [3] presented a novel HT and hid it in the RTL code. Besides, other phases during FPGA lifetime, such as device design, fabrication and assembly, etc., can also be exploited for HT inserting, as shown in Fig. 1b [4] . Such circumstances greatly challenge the FPGA security, calling for more powerful HT detection techniques.
FPGA HT detection can be divided into two categories. One is based on physical information analyzing which is
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Remigiusz Wisniewski. with high efficiency in detecting the large and medium scale Trojans in FPGAs by analyzing their side channel information, e.g., Iwase et al. [5] isolate the chip power signature to detect HT in the Trojan-infected FPGAs by using SVM (Support Vector Machine). The other refers to design file analyzing method which can isolate the Trojan-infected FPGAs by analyzing the characteristics of their netlist or RTL code. This method, albeit often time-consuming, can find out small and even tiny Trojans in FPGAs. For example, Hicks et al. [6] propose a UCI (Unused Circuit Identification) method which identifies the never used RTL code, shrinking the code space left for HTs. Guo et al. [7] perform theorem proving and equivalence checking on RTL code to ensure there are no additional functions which are not defined in design specification. Zhang et al. [8] detect HTs in a design by identifying the redundant logics in its netlist. However, common FPGA end users can only access FPGA bitstream 1 rather than netlist or RTL code. To address this dilemma, we propose a new comprehensive FPGA reverse engineering tool-chain, which can precisely convert bitstream to RTL code, paving the way for netlist/code-based hardware Trojans detection.
In this paper, our main contributions are threefold:
• We propose a tool-chain for FPGA reverse engineering, involving three tools, namely, library generator (LG), bitstream reversal tool (BRT) and netlist reversal tool (NRT).
LG individually tests all kinds of FPGA resources, removes the interferences among different components, and thereby, obtains an exhaustive and accurate mapping relationship between bit values and FPGA configuration. BRT retrieves a netlist from the intercepted bitstream. To get a precise netlist, we embed a patching algorithm in BRT to deduce the working states of some special elements which depend on not only the value of configuration bits but also the state of neighbor elements. NRT recovers RTL code from netlist. To ensure the correctness of decompiling process, it splits the retrieved netlist into multiple independent clusters and replaces their elements and connections with functionally equivalent code.
• We perform extensive experiments to evaluate our tool-chain qualitatively and quantitatively, and make comparison with some existing re-engineering tools.
In qualitative evaluation, we illustrate that we construct an integrated tool-chain which covers all reversing stages, i.e., bitstream-to-netlist and netlist-to-code, outperforming the existing tools. In quantitatively evaluation, we report the correct rate of decompiled netlist, i.e., 100%, for 13 benchmarks and validate that their recovered RTL code is functionally equivalent to the original one. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first integrated and accurate re-engineering tool which can decompile FPGA bitstream to code without any support from other tools.
• We present a case study to demonstrate the effectiveness of our tool-chain in assisting HT detection. In detail, we first recover the netlist and RTL code from bitstream which corresponds to a Trojan-infected application by using our tool-chain, and then employ two HT detection techniques, COTD (Controllability and 1 FPGA bitstream is a binary file that contains configuration data for an FPGA. Its detailed format is usually proprietary and undocumented.
Observability for hardware Trojan Detection) [9] and CA (Coverage Analysis) [10] , to check the recovered files, respectively. The experimental results reveal that the malicious logics can be successfully identified in this working flow. Hence, our tool-chain is helpful for ensuring FPGA hardware security.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly discuss related work. In Section III, we detail our tool-chain. The methodology on how to construct bitstream mapping database and the working flow of our BRT and NRT tools are introduced. In Section IV, we evaluate our tool qualitatively and quantitatively, and in Section V, we present a case study to demonstrate the effectiveness of our tool-chain in assisting HT detection. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Hardware reverse engineering is a process of understanding the architecture and functionality of electronic systems via special methods. At chip level, it touches upon two kinds of devices, ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit) and FPGA.
A. ASIC REVERSE ENGINEERING
The purpose of ASIC reverse engineering is to obtain high-level description of the manufactured circuits. It contains two stages: chip reverse engineering and netlist reverse engineering. Chip reversing recovers netlist from the implemented circuit, involving both non-destructive and destructive techniques [11] . In non-destructive methods, X-ray tomography is often used to provide layer images for chips. For example, the work in [12] takes advantage of a beam of X-rays at a piece of Intel processor to reconstruct the chip transistors and wires. Destructive reverse engineering, on the other hand, refers to etching and grinding chip layer-bylayer, which is quite time-consuming and requires expensive instruments [13] . As such, only several companies can offer destructive reverse engineering services.
Netlist-level reverse engineering generates high-level description from the gate-level netlist, and plenty of techniques have been reported. For example, Li et al. [14] present a systemic way to automatically derive code structure from circuit netlist. Meade et al. [15] propose a netlist reverse engineering tool-set which can recover the functionality of the netlist into FSMs (Finite State Machines). Subramanyan et al. [16] identify all components from the netlist, such as register, counter and adders, etc., and then describe them by using high-level abstraction. Thereafter, they improve the efficiency of the method, scaling it to large-scale ICs with almost million elements [17] . Bitstream reversing decompiles FPGA bitstream to netlist. As a pioneer work of this domain, Ziener et al. [18] investigate the bitstream of Virtex-II FPGA and abstract the LUT (Look Up Table) contents from it. Afterwards, Note and Rannaud [19] propose a cross-correlation algorithm to build the relationship between the bitstream and the configurable elements for multiple Xilinx FPGAs. By using the same algorithm as [19] , Benz et al. [20] present a tool called BIL, which considers both configurable and unconfigurable FPGA elements, and successfully recovers a fraction of netlist from bitstream. After that, Yoon et al. [21] correct some errors in BIL to improve its reversing accuracy, generating an advanced tool to retrieve netlist from FPGA bitstream. To improve the reversing accuracy, Ding et al. propose two new algorithms, PK (Position Known) analysis and PUK (Position Un-Known) analysis, to collect the bitstream mapping information. The experiments reveal that the correctness of their reversed netlists can achieve at least 88% [22] . In [23] , the project IceStorm demonstrates a reversing tool which can successfully decompile the bitstreams of Lattice iCE40 FPGAs. In contrast to the above reversing tools focusing on unencrypted bitstreams, some works move their targets on the encrypted files. For example, Swierczynski et al. [24] propose a novel attack named BiFI, which can manipulate an encrypted bitstream to obtain valuable information from it without the need of full bitstream reversal.
FPGA netlist reversing generates high-level description, e.g., RTL code, based on the netlist file. Since FPGA netlist is similar to ASIC netlist, the netlist reversing techniques for ASIC can be easily implanted to FPGA. Cheremisinov [25] puts his efforts in this domain. For Xilinx FPGAs, he first convert netlist to a readable XDL (Xilinx Design Language) file, and then design an automation tool to generate HDL (Hardware Description Language) code according to it.
III. OUR WORK
In this section, we give an overview of FPGA architecture, detail our FPGA reverse engineering tool-chain, and report the time complexity of our tool-chain. Each logic tile contains multiple LBs (Logic Blocks) with various functional elements, such as LUTs, FFs (Flip-Flops) and multiplexers, etc. These elements can be configured through bitstream to implement the desired functions. 2 I/O tiles are located at the periphery of FPGA, they work as communication interface bridging the FPGA to the outside world. Similar to the logic tile, each I/O tile contains multiple IOBs (I/O Blocks) as well. In one IOB, there are several configurable elements, e.g., inverter, buffer and pull-up resistance, etc., and one PAD, a non-configurable element. By using bitstream, IOBs can be set to either input or output mode. Interconnection tile is the internal communication infrastructure of FPGA, transferring signals between LBs and IOBs. Two kinds of boxes, configurable switch box and unconfigurable connection box, are involved in each interconnection tile. Switch box contains plenty of PS (Programmable Switches) which can be configured to be ON or OFF state, building connections between wires accordingly. On the other hand, connection box links specific wires together through a set of fixed connections.
Therefore, FPGA physical structure can be easily modified by programming the LBs, IOBs and switch boxes with the bitstream, implementing various functions as we want. 
B. OUR FPGA REVERSE ENGINEERING TOOL-CHAIN
The flow of our FPGA reverse engineering is given in Fig. 2b . First, we wire-tap the configuration lines on PCB (Printed Circuit Board) and power on our target FPGA. When the FPGA loads its bitstream from the external non-volatile memory, we immediately intercept the bitstream and save it. Then, we feed the obtained bitstream into our tool-chain. Supported by the database which contains FPGA architecture information and bitstream mapping information, our BRT (Bitstream Reversal Tool) decompiles the bitstream to the netlist, and subsequently, our NRT (Netlist Reversal Tool) converts the netlist to RTL code. Note that unless otherwise stated, the FPGA in this paper refers to SRAM-based FPGA, rather than antifuse and flash FPGAs which have no needs for outside bitstream. Moreover, the bitstream fed into our tool-chain should be an unencrypted file. 3 
1) DATABASE
Database is the bedrock for FPGA reverse engineering. It supplies two parts of necessary information for our BRT and NRT tools, referring to FPGA architecture and bitstream mapping.
FPGA architecture information includes all hardware details of our target FPGAs, such as the quantity, location and all possible working patterns for functional elements and their connections. This information can be obtained from the corresponding FPGA vendor. For example, the Xilinx ISE (Integrated Synthesis Environment) provides a set of textual files describing the architecture of Xilinx FPGAs separately. Bitstream mapping information points out the relationship between the value of bits and the working patterns of configurable components, i.e., the logic states of elements or the ON/OFF status of programmable switches. We integrate a library generator in our database to figure out the mapping information through thorough black-box testing.
The working flow of our library generator is shown in Fig. 3a .
Step 1 (Initialization): We first directly write a blank netlist file N 0 and convert it to a bitstream B 0 . Note that a bitstream includes both initialization frames and configuration frames. The initialization frames set the booting modes of FPGA while the configuration frames determine the implemented function in FPGA. In this paper, our library generator only focuses on the configuration frames since we aim to retrieve the FPGA function.
Step 2 (Tile Testing): For all configurable elements in a logic tile, we add them into N 0 , one element at a time, and test their mapping information. In detail, we first build a tabulation to record the possible working patterns for the added element, and then go through its possible working patterns one-by-one to generate a group of netlists. Afterwards, we transform these netlists to bitstreams and further compare them with B 0 separately. In this way, we can find out the bits with different values and further determine the mapping relationship for the added element. Note that 1) the mapping relationship for components in I/O and interconnection tiles can be determined similarly, and 2) the tile testing time is linearly proportional to the number of components in a tile since we tackle every component individually.
Step 3 (Offset Computing): Offset value is the distance of configuration frames from one tile to another, as defined in [22] . In this step, we find out the offset value of two tiles with the same type, i.e., two logic tiles or two I/O tiles or two interconnection tiles. Specifically, we first choose two logic tiles, one tested tile as our baseline and one untested tile as our target, set them with the same configuration, and modify the netlist N 0 accordingly. In other words, we separately modify the blank netlist to implement the same function on the baseline tile and the untested tile. As such, we can obtain two modified netlists from N 0 , and then generate two bitstream files for calculating the offset value. Fig. 4 gives an example to illustrate this procedure intuitively. As we can see, the tested tile is configured through the frame i to i + N , while the untested tile, e.g., Tile 1 , corresponds to another N frames from j to j + N . The distance between frame i to frame j is exactly the offset value for Tile 1 against the baseline, i.e., offset 1 = j − i. For the other two kinds of tiles (I/O and Interconnection), we repeat the above operations and get their offset values separately.
Step 4 (Offset Traversal): We move our target to another untested tile in the same type while maintaining the baseline unchanged. Then, we find out the offset value between the new target and the baseline. By repeatedly performing the above operations, we can figure out all offset values for untested tiles, as shown in Fig. 4 . After that, we can deduce all mapping information for the target FPGA by using the baseline mapping relationship and the offset values. Step 5 (Stored Procedure): For convenience, we save the mapping information in three pre-defined tables, namely EMT (Element Mapping Table) , PSMT (Programmable Switch Mapping Table) and OVT (Offset Values Table) . EMT contains the mapping relationship of elements in the baseline logic and I/O tiles, while PSMT refers to that of switches in the baseline interconnection tile. Note that EMT and PSMT has the same structure, they are multiple-row tables in which each row consists of four parts, a component's i) name, ii) one possible working pattern, iii) the configuration bits addresses, and iv) the bits' value corresponding to the pattern. On the other hand, OVT records the offset values for other tiles against the baseline. It is also a multiple-row table in which each row comprises three parts, i.e., a tile's i) name, ii) type, and iii) offset value.
While presenting the above steps, we make the following notes.
1. In order to get accurate mapping information, we perform thorough black-box testing for FPGA resources in a one-by-one manner. This sometimes disobeys the FPGA design rules as some functional elements and programmable switches in FPGA cannot be used alone. Therefore, we disable the DRC (Design Rule Check) function in EDA tool before we generate bitstream from the modified netlists. 4 2. Although we collect the solely mapping relationship from configurable resources to bit values, we still come across the MVOE problem (Multiple Values for 4 Most of the FPGA vendors integrate DRC function in their EDA (Electronics Design Automation) tools to monitor the behavior of netlists. Once a netlist disobeys the predefined rules, DRC generates a warning information and hinder the conversion from netlist to bitstream. One Element) [22] which means that the same value of configuration bits may be mapped to multiple working patterns. To determine the working pattern of the elements with MVOE problem, we need the patterns of their neighbors in addition to mapping relationship. Hence, we propose a patching method and implement it in our BRT to address this issue. More details are discussed in Section III-B2.
3. We use offset values to deduce the mapping information for tiles except the three baselines which corresponds to I/O, logic and interconnection tiles. This method is reasonable due to the high regularity of FPGA architecture, as discussed in previous work [19] , [22] . In addition, compared to the time-consuming testing for elements and connections in a one-by-one manner, offset computing can be quickly finished to figure out the mapping relationship for a tile.
2) BITSTREAM REVERSAL TOOL
BRT transforms a bitstream to a netlist file which details the function of used elements and the routing paths among them. The working flow of BRT is drawn in Fig. 3b .
Step 1 (Initialization): In this step, we read the intercepted bitstream file and load the necessary information, i.e., the bitstream mapping and FPGA architecture information in our database.
Step 2 (Routing Reversal): According to the bitstream and database, we find out the turn-on programmable switches, and separately take them as a starting point in BFS (Breadth-First Search) algorithm to recover all signal nets [28] . Here net is composed of a set of connections which transfer the same signal from a source element to one or more sink elements.
Step 3 (Information Patching): As stated in Section B1, we test the FPGA elements one-by-one and encounter a MVOE problem, which means that multiple working patterns may be mapped into the same configuration bits value. By investigating the working mechanism of FPGA elements, we find that the independent testing method, albeit easy to be implemented, may result in information loss when it decouples the elements. For example, the working pattern of MUX element in Fig. 5 is determined through three configuration bits (SEL signal) in combination with a driven signal from upstream elements. When the three configuration bits are set to be '011', the MUX may be either powered OFF (no driven signal from E1) or in switching status (from VOLUME 7, 2019 the first input port to its output port when E1 is working). Therefore, we cannot determine the MUX working pattern if we only access its configuration information. To solve this problem, we pick out all elements with uncertain patterns, analyze their correlation with neighbors and patch the missed information to elements accordingly.
Algorithm 1 Patching Method Solving MVOE Problem
Input: T -The element mapping for each pattern u ∈ U do 10 required patterns R ← solve_MVOE(u, N, C) 11 extend P by adding a line including e, u and R 12 end 13 end 14 end Algorithm 1 displays the flow of our patching method for solving the MVOE problem. It requires three inputs, i.e., the element mapping table (T), FPGA architecture information (A) and a series of pre-defined constraints (C), to generate the table of patched information (P). Specifically, we first initialize P as an empty set Ø (line 1). Then, we extract the configurable elements in the baseline tiles (E) from the element mapping table (T) as our targets (line 2). Line 3-14 go through E to patch information for the special elements. We obtain the uncertain patterns of e (U) based on T at first (line 4). If U is an empty set Ø (line 5), we execute the Continue command to analyze the next element (line 6). Otherwise, we abstract all neighbor elements of e (N) from A (line 8). Then, for each uncertain pattern u, we apply multiple pre-defined constraints (C) on e and its neighbors to figure out the required patterns (R) of elements in N (line 10), and finally, we add e, u, R to P (line 11). In this way, we can generate a table P containing the patches for all MVOE elements in E.
Step 4 (Element Reversal): We justify the working pattern for all functional elements based on the bitstream file, the database and our patch information, and then the function of each element can be determined. Now, we can obtain all information about the elements being used as well as the routing paths among them.
Step 5 (Netlist Output): We assemble the routing information and the functional elements into a netlist file.
3) NETLIST REVERSAL TOOL
NRT (Netlist Reversal Tool) retrieves RTL code from the recovered netlist file. The working flow of NRT is shown in Fig. 3c .
Step 1 (Initialization): We read the netlist file from BRT and transform its information, such as element function and routing paths, into a predefined data structure. The FPGA architecture information is also loaded to support code reversing operation.
Step 2 (I/O Determination): We find out the IO ports to generate the ports declaration part in our reversed RTL code. To achieve this goal, we classify all PAD elements in the netlist into two modes, input and output, according to their inherent property. If a PAD works as the source element in a net, it is defined as an input port. Otherwise, it is an output port.
Step 3 (Cluster Extraction): We extract all signal path clusters from the netlist file. A signal path cluster contains multiple signal paths, which are originated from different input PADs, one PAD for one path and end with the same output PAD. In this paper, we first track all signal paths belonging to one cluster from an output PAD by using the DFS (Depth-First Search) algorithm [28] , and then repeat the above operations until all clusters in the given netlist are found out. Note that one input PAD may be included in multiple signal path clusters. For example, as shown in Fig. 6 , two clusters make use of the input PAD2 as their input ports, leading to duplicated port definition during code generation which will be solved in the last step.
Step 4 (Code Generation): We generate RTL code for each cluster. In detail, we separately replace the functional elements with their equivalent RTL code, and combine them together according to the cluster structure and the path properties. For example, the FF (Flip-Flop) in Fig. 6 has two types of signals, data and clock. For the clock signal, we put the clock name ''PAD3'' into the code ''always@()'' as the sensitive parameter. For the data signal, we use the data name ''PAD2'' and ''PAD5'' to replace the input and output of FF characteristic equation, respectively. Step 5 (RTL Output): We input all RTL code into one file, detect and remove the duplicated input ports, if any, and declare the module name for the whole code.
C. DISCUSSION
We report the time complexity of our tool-chain for each step in Table 1 . As we can see, the time complexity of library generator is O(n + k), depending on two variables, i.e., the number of configurable elements in a tile (n) and the number of tiles in the FPGA (k). On the other hand, the time complexity of BRT and NRT are respectively O(m 2 + n) and O(m 2 ), mainly depending on the number of used components m in the design. In addition, we note that the mapping database constructed by the library generator is only related to the detailed FPGA architecture. Hence, for a given FPGA, we only need to invoke the library generator one time. Subsequently, the constructed mapping database can be re-used for re-engineering any application on that FPGA. 
IV. EVALUATION
We evaluate our tool-chain both qualitatively and quantitatively.
A. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
We compare our work with five existing FPGA reversing tools, namely, Debit [19] , BIL [20] , BRET [21] , Bit2ncd [22] and DAT [25] . Table 2 lists the detailed database and functions in each tool, including FPGA architecture information, bitstream mapping information, bitstream reversing and netlist reversing.
From Table 2 , we can observe that our tool-chain is comprehensive for FPGA reverse engineering since it contains all necessary information, i.e., FPGA architecture and bitstream mapping information, as well as functions. In other words, our tool-chain can decompile the intercepted bitstream to RTL code without any support from other tools and databases. In contrast, the existing five tools can only accomplish a part of FPGA reverse engineering since they concern about different phases in re-engineering. Particularly, Debit, BIL, BRET and Bit2ncd put their efforts on bitstream re-engineering while DAT is dedicated to netlist reengineering. In addition, the four existing bitstream reversing tools may generate a netlist with few errors when targeting complex designs, as their databases and functions remain to be improved, as mentioned in [19] - [22] .
B. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
To evaluate the effectiveness of our tool-chain, we perform experiments on two well-recognized benchmarks, ISCAS'85 and ISCAS'89, and three real applications, 8051 core, 68HC08 and AES. Xilinx Spartan-6 is taken as our target FPGA and ISE is used to compile the benchmarks to bitstream. Then, we intercept the bitstream and feed it into our tool-chain. In the following experiments, our tool-chain runs on a PC with Intel Core i3-3240 CPU, which works at 3.40GHz main frequency, 4.0 GB RAM, and Windows 7 SP1 32-bit operating system.
1) BITSTREAM REVERSE ENGINEERING
We report the logic cost and bitstream reverse engineering results in Table 3 . The logic cost stands for the complexity of our benchmarks, which is quantified by the numbers of FE (Functional Elements in logic tiles and IO tiles) and PS (Programmable Switches). The experimental results evaluate the accuracy and time overhead of our BRT tool.
Our BRT can perfectly decompile a bitstream to netlist as the recovered netlists are totally the same as the original files in both FE and PS for all benchmarks. Moreover, based on the experimental results, we have enough confidence to claim that our tool-chain can achieve 100% reversing correct rate for any design because the 13 benchmarks in Table 3 involve all kinds of components in the target FPGA. We attribute this interesting result to our powerful library generator and patching technique in BRT. As illustrated in Section III, they help to abstract precise bitstream mapping information and solve the MVOE problem, respectively, and therefore, ensuring the accuracy of bitstream reversing results.
Besides, we can observe that the reversing time ranges from 5.23 to 623.21 minutes (< 11 hours), being proportional to the logic complexity of experimental circuits. In general, the time overhead is tolerable for these cases, and if necessary, we can shorten the reversing time by applying parallel computing techniques to our tool-chain, e.g., executing the reversing process with multiple parallel threads in GPU (Graphics Processing Unit), which is a special processor widely used in computers for parallel computing [29] , [30] . 
2) NETLIST REVERSE ENGINEERING
We decompile the netlist from BRT, report the time cost and verification results in Table 4 , and illustrate the correctness of our NRT tool. The time cost is counted from the time when our NRT loads a netlist file to the time when the corresponding RTL code is generated. The formal verification is performed by Synopsys Formality tool, which can detect the difference between the original code and the recovered code in this paper. From Table 4 , we can draw the following two conclusions. First, our NRT is a real-time tool since it needs only hundreds to thousands of milliseconds to finish the netlist reverse engineering process for all benchmarks. Second, our NRT tool can precisely transform the netlist to RTL code since all the generated code successfully passes the formal verification. In other words, they are functionally equivalent to the original codes.
3) QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON WITH OTHER WORKS
We compare our tool-chain with existing reversing works, two bitstream reversing tools (Debit [19] , Bit2ncd [22] ) and one netlist reversing tool (DAT [25] ), in reversing accuracy and time cost. To make fair comparison, pong circuit which can control the paddles in an electronic pong game is implemented on a Xilinx Spartan-3 FPGA, as advised in [22] . From Table 5 , we can observe that although our tool-chain consumes more time for bitstream reversing, it achieves 100% reversing accuracy in both FE and PS, outperforming Debit and Bit2ncd. Note that a 100% correct netlist is crucial for assisting hardware Trojan detection, in that an inaccurate netlist may distort or eliminate the Trojan logic, reducing the HT detection rate significantly. In addition, both our tool-chain and DAT can retrieve RTL code from the netlist within hundreds of milliseconds, and the two retrieved code files can successfully pass through the formal verification. In other words, the two retrieved code files are functionally equivalent to the original design.
In summary, we can claim that our tool-chain is comprehensive and precise for FPGA reverse engineering. Besides, the accurate bitstream reversing provides the advantageous foundation for future HT detection.
V. CASE STUDY: HARDWARE TROJAN DETECTION
Now, we present a case study to demonstrate the effectiveness of our tool-chain in assisting FPGA HT detection methods.
In detail, we discuss i) how COTD [9] finds out HTs from our recovered netlist, and ii) how coverage analysis [10] identifies the malicious code with the assistance of our tool-chain.
A. HARDWARE TROJAN DETECTION WITH RECOVERED NETLIST
To validate that our tool-chain can assist COTD technique, we perform the experiment on a Trust-Hub benchmark, namely, s38417 [31] . Specifically, we implement the benchmark on Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA, intercept the bitstream upon FPGA boot-up and obtain a recovered netlist by using our tool-chain. After that, we feed the recovered netlist into COTD for HT detection.
1) DETECTION IN NETLIST RECOVERED FROM INTACT BITSTREAM
The COTD technique can calculate the controllability and observability of each signal in the netlist, and differentiate the suspicious (potentially malicious) signals from the trusted ones using unsupervised clustering method accordingly. The results of applying COTD on the recovered netlist are reported in Fig. 7 . From Fig. 7a , we can observe that COTD splits the signals of recovered, Trojan-infected netlist into two groups. One corresponds to the trustable logics (black dots) and the other refers to Trojan logics (red dots). In contrast, the recovered, Trojan-free netlist contains only trustable logic circuits, as shown in Fig. 7b . Hence, our tool-chain can work as an assistant for COTD technique, i.e., providing recovered netlist, to detect HTs in FPGAs. 
2) DETECTION IN NETLIST RECOVERED FROM CORRUPTED BITSTREAM
According to Section V-A1, the COTD technique can accurately detect HTs from our recovered netlist. Nevertheless, if the intercepted bitstream gets corrupted (the values of some bits are reversed) due to the poor contact between the probe and configuration lines, the recovered netlist may deviate from the original one and thus affects the HT detection.
To evaluate the influence of bitstream corruptions, we perform a comparative experiment on the Trojan-infected s38417 benchmark. We first divide the FPGA with Trojans into three parts, i.e., unused logics, authentic logics (used) and Trojan logics (used), as depicted in Fig. 8a . The unused logics are the powered off region in an FPGA, and in contrast, the used logics refer to the activated components. Furthermore, if an active component serves as a part of Trojan circuit, it is contributed to Trojan logics, otherwise, it is authentic logic. Accordingly, as illustrated in Fig. 8b , all configuration bits in a bitstream can also be categorized to three types, corresponding to unused, authentic (used) and Trojan (used) logics. Now, we generate 30 corrupted bitstreams, ten per type, by randomly reversing the value of some bits (in this paper, we assume that 0.1 % configuration bits in a bitstream are corrupted). Afterwards, we recover netlists from these corrupted bitstreams by using our tool-chain and employ the COTD technique to detect HTs in them. The average reversing accuracy and HT detection rate are reported in Fig. 8c .
As shown in Fig. 8c , when the corruption operations occur in unused bits, we can still obtain correct netlists and identify HT in them with 100% detection rate. It is reasonable because the corruptions in the unused bits usually turn on some isolated programmable components which will be marked as abnormal points and removed during the bitstream reversing. As such, they will not introduce any modification to the retrieved netlist. In contrast, when corruptions happen in the authentic or Trojan bits, they will cause some errors on the retrieved netlist, degrading both the re-engineering accuracy and the HT detection rate. In detail, for authentic (Trojan) bits, the average reversing accuracy of Functional Elements and Programmable Switches decreases to 80.2% (83.4%) and 73.8% (79.6%), respectively. In addition, the corruption on Trojan bits results in a worse Trojan detection rate, i.e., 20%, than that of authentic bits (60%).
B. HARDWARE TROJAN DETECTION WITH RECOVERED RTL CODE
We employ our tool-chain to retrieve RTL code from the recovered, Trojan-infected s38417 netlist, and then utilize the coverage analysis technique to search for malicious logics VOLUME 7, 2019 in the retrieved code. A well-recognized commercial tool, Synopsys VCS, is used to report the code coverage result automatically and the uncovered lines of code are marked as Trojan [10] . Fig. 9a ) which cannot be executed during our code coverage analysis process. It corresponds to the Trojan Trigger signal of Trojan circuit, Net21 in Fig. 9b , which is in accordance with the netlist detection result, as depicted in Fig. 7a . Therefore, our tool-chain can work in conjunction with the coverage analysis technique to identify hardware Trojans.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new comprehensive tool-chain which can precisely reverse the FPGA bitstream to RTL code. First, we build an integrated database by conducting thorough black-box testing for configurable FPGA elements and connections. Then, we present two reversing tools, BRT and NRT. With the bitstream mapping and FPGA architecture information in the database, BRT transforms the intercepted bitstream to netlist and NRT further decompiles the netlist to RTL code. After that, we perform extensive experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of our tool-chain. The experimental results reveal that our tool-chain can solely accomplish the whole reversing process from FPGA bitstream to RTL code, and the recovered code is functionally equivalent to the original one. Finally, we present a case study to demonstrate that our tool-chain can assist existing techniques to identify HTs at netlist and RTL code level. From the perspective of hardware security, we believe that our tool-chain can make a significant contribution to thwart HT attacks on FPGAs.
Our tool-chain can only decompile the unencrypted FPGA bitstreams. But this is not a serious problem for some application areas with strict power restriction. For example, terminals in IoT space are preferred to use low-end FPGAs, most of which do not offer bitstream encryption and can be covered by our tool-chain. Also, we note that there are some advanced techniques can decrypt the encrypted FPGA bitstreams, e.g., side channel attack [26] , [27] , [32] , showing a promising direction to extend the applicable scope of our tool-chain. 
